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Bound to Lose! The Tea Party and Pro-
Köln: 
Right-Wing Populist Reactions to Mosque 
Construction. A comparative analysis 
N O A H  T E L S O N   
 
Mit Hinweis darauf, dass sich rechts-populistische Bewegungen immer mehr in der westlichen Welt verbrei-
ten, ist eine Neubewertung des extrem rechten politischen Denkens und der Bereitschaft in der Bevölkerung 
dies zu unterstützen angesagt. Dies is besonders notwendig aufgrund der Flut des kürzlichen Tea Party-
esquen Aktivismus in Nordamerika, in Form der unverhohlenen Verehrung für die von 'Menschen angeführ-
ten' pro Markt Revolution und der so genannten "Minutemen" Miliz, und die umfassende Kommunikation 
und Zusammenarbeit zwischen den verschiedenen rechtsextremen Bewegungen in den europäischen Natio-
nen, bis hin zu den jüngsten Gräueltaten in Norwegen. Dieses Papier stellt einen wichtigen Schritt auf dem 
Weg dar, die Probleme bezüglich rechts-populistischer Tendenzen der heutigen Zeit zu addressieren, vor al-
lem im sozialen Bereich, wo viele Menschen Gefahr laufen, von diesen Bewegungen stark ausgegrenzt zu 
werden. Durch die vergleichende Analyse wirft diese Untersuchung einen Blick auf zwei rechts-populistische 
Bewegungen: die Tea Party in den USA und Pro-Köln in Deutschland und wie sie sich in einer Reihe von Vari-
ablen unterscheiden, auch wenn ihre Anforderungen an die Gesellschaft sehr ähnlich sind. 
 
Stichworte: Populismus, Moschee, Pro-Köln, Tea-Party 
 
With evidence that right-wing populist movements are becoming increasingly more widespread throughout 
the Western world, a reevaluation of far-right political thought and their propensity for popular support is in 
order. This is particularly necessary given the spate of recent Tea Party-esqe ‘activism’ throughout North 
America, in the form of unabashed reverence for ‘people-led’ pro market revolution and so called ‘minute-
men’ militia, and the extensive communication and cooperation between the various far-right movements 
throughout the European nations, capped by the recent atrocities in Norway. This paper shall provide an im-
portant stepping stone into addressing the very real problems concerning rightwing populist trends of today, 
particularly in the social realm, where many people run the risk of being severely marginalized by these 
movements. Through comparative analysis, this exploration takes a look at two right-wing populist move-
ments, The Tea Party in America and Pro-Köln in Germany, and how they differ in a range of variables, even 
though their demands on society are very similar. 
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Introduction 
I’m gonna tell you fascists 
You may be surprised 
The people in this world 
Are getting organized 
You’re bound to lose 
You fascists bound to lose 
Woody Guthrie 
In 2008, shortly after the election of President Obama, a curious movement began 
attracting national attention: So-called grassroots groups of concerned citizens banned 
together in various regions, collectively calling themselves the ‘Tea Party’.  Initially 
fueled by the overhaul of the healthcare system in the US, these apparent ‘average 
Joe’ Americans grew increasingly in popularity and in scope. While their main concerns 
were aimed at controlling fiscal spending and limiting ‘big government’, some Tea 
Party members began expanding the list of grievances to include more social concerns.  
Espousing worries of what they considered the destruction of ‘Christian social values’, 
the Tea Party also began to lead the charge against the ‘Islamization’ of America. They 
became vocal dissidents of Muslim presence in the country, and began campaigns to 
cleanse the nation of perceived Islamic threats, like mosque construction (Goodstein, 
2010; Hernandez 2010; Hutchinson 2010; Rehab 2010; Vogel 2010; Wheaton 2010; 
Williams 2011).    
When mainstream news outlets began reporting, in the summer of 2010, plans to 
construct a Muslim community center in downtown Manhattan, two blocks from where 
the World Trade Center once stood, the Tea Party rhetoric kicked into overdrive, 
slating the event as an attempt by Muslims to demonstrate a ‘victorious invasion’ 
(Goodstein 2010). Indeed, as the decision was made to clear the way for the 
construction at a final city commission meeting, “[…] several members of the audience 
shouted “Shame on you!” and “Disgrace!” One woman carried a sign reading, “Don’t 
Glorify Murders of 3,000; No 9/11 Victory Mosque”” (Hernandez 2010). Much of the 
headlines of the summer were swamped with similar accounts of anti-Islamic rhetoric. 
The campaign, although unsuccessful in halting construction, preceded the biggest 
breakthrough for the Tea Party since its inception; Tea Party backed Republicans won a 
remarkable amount of seats in that year’s election, suggesting for many that the Tea 
Party rhetoric was resonating with people (Carson/ Pettigrew 2011: 14; Karpowitz/ 
Monson/ Patterson/ Pope 2011: 308). 
N O A H  T E L S O N  
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Two years earlier, across the Atlantic, a similar trend was emerging in the strongest 
economic power in Europe. News had spread that the Romanic city of Cologne, in the 
western part of the country, had just approved plans for the construction of what 
would be the largest mosque in Germany.  In the city, whose idyllic skyline features 
the Catholic cathedral Dom, a small group of concerned citizens formed to combat 
what they, too, saw as the destruction of western values through the presence of 
Islam. This group would call themselves Pro-Köln, and would organize protests that 
would also soon grow in size. Pro-Köln generated enough support to begin expanding 
and eventually transformed into a larger regional movement, Pro-NRW (Nordrhein-
Westfalen), and even further, to encompass all of Germany under the title: Pro-
Deutschland. On May 7, 2011, Pro-Köln, with support from similar movements in 
neighboring countries like Vlaams Belang of Belgium, FPÖ of Austria, and Bloc 
Identitaire of France, held a rally, “Marsch für die Freiheit” in Cologne, to shore up 
support against ‘creeping Islamization’ (Rose 2011). This rapid expansion may be 
evidence that, ‘Islamization’ is a real concern for a growing amount of citizens in 
Europe, particularly in Germany (Pew Research Center 2005: 1).   
Despite this rise, Pro-Köln has only experienced minimal success when compared to 
that of the Tea Party. While Pro-Köln is a growing force, it does not enjoy nearly as 
much support in the electorate as the Tea Party does. Whereas between 27 and 32 
percent of overall voters identifying with the Tea Party in the national midterm 
elections (Colombant 2010), Pro-Köln’s electoral success is so far limited to a small 
percentage of the vote (5.4%) to the Cologne City Council (Deutsche Welle 2008; 
Kölner Statistische Nachrichten 2009). Considering that a particular brand of right-
wing movements, that include anti-Islamization as a major part of their platform, have 
increased in numbers throughout the western world, what accounts for the difference 
in the impact between countries, particularly when the topics and issues they address 
are similar? In short, why does the Tea Party’s message seem to resonate louder with 
Americans than that of the Pro-Köln message with the German population?   
In general, this thesis will attempt to answer these questions by applying a ‘most-
different’ design to comparatively analyze these movements as right-wing populist 
movements. Both movements are identified as such by the definition provided by 
Albertazzi and McDonnell, who argue that populism is, “an ideology which pits a 
virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who 
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are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of 
their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice” (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 3). It 
is quite evident that the rhetoric espoused by both movements supports this definition.  
Both Tea Party and Pro-Köln locate (some, if not all of) their struggle against the 
presence of Muslims (the ‘dangerous others’), who are ‘depriving’ them of their 
‘identity’ (Pro-Köln 2009b; Rehab 2010: 3) As outlined, this thesis will exclusively 
examine the Tea Party movement in the United States and the Pro-
Köln/NRW/Deutschland movement in Germany and how they make very similar 
demands on their society in very similar contexts with divergent outcomes. This 
context, for the ease of comparison, is restricted to the reaction these movements 
have toward the construction of Muslim mosques and prayer houses, particularly on 
Park51 in Manhattan and the Zentralmoschee Köln in Cologne, respectively. It will 
attempt to shed light on how these two movements, fighting for the preservation of 
their conception of ‘western culture’, lead the charge against Islamic presence in 
western nations, yet ultimately end up with differing results.  
As was expressed earlier and will be further examined later, the Tea Party is by all 
accounts more successful than Pro-Köln, despite having nearly all the same demands.  
According to literature on populist phenomena the following are ideal locations for 
examination when attempting to extract differences among populist movements: 
(1) the social background from which populist parties emerge;  
(2) their ideological characteristics;  
(3) their organizational forms and the techniques deployed to appeal to voters […]  
(Decker 2008: 121) 
By examining these areas, this thesis will ultimately show how, even though analogous 
archetypes of right-wing populist movements emerge in differing societies, they may 
ultimately share little else in common because of peculiarities in their respective 
countries. In doing so, this exercise will parse out the numerous differences between 
the two cases, laying bare independent variables that will explain how the right-wing 
populist anti-Islamic rhetoric succeeds in garnering support in the face of mosque 
construction (the Tea Party) and how it does not (Pro-Köln). The various qualitative 
indicators that will be examined in this exploration include: media representation, 
quality of leadership and the capabilities of that agency, political structuring and the 
N O A H  T E L S O N  





GET MA WP 05/2014 
ease at which creating new political formations can happen within governmental 
structures and within society, and, lastly, the role of historical conditions (Albertazzi/ 
McDonnell 2008: 10). These variables will illuminate in the end the main conditions in 
which these movements can either be successful or not.   
It is necessary to bear in mind that neither movement has achieved its stated aim at 
preventing mosques from being built, and are not considered ‘successful’ by this 
measure. In this case, ‘success’ is not a quantitative measurement of ‘mosque 
construction prevention’, but rather a qualitative approach that looks at how the 
movements have faired in the advent of their anti-Islamic/anti-mosque campaigns. It 
will examine success through the various indicators mentioned above, arguing that a 
populist movement is successful (or, at least more successful than others) when it is 
favorably considered by these indicators. For example, a right-wing populist movement 
can be considered more successful if its leadership possesses important assets such as 
charisma and public access than a movement whose leadership lacks these certain 
resources that aid favorable exposure. By undertaking this examination, this thesis will 
provide a deeper understanding of how populism (particularly right-wing populism) 
thrives in today’s political climate.  
This thesis is structured into four major chapters. The first chapter provides a 
categorization of populist movements and how they arise in society.  Here, a deeper 
analysis into populism theory will concentrate on the organizational and relational 
aspects of populist movements and will ultimately allow us to categorize these 
particular movements as right-wing populist movements. The objective is not so much 
how to explain these movements, but rather identifying characteristics which define 
them as such.  Accompanying this more concrete analytical research will be a general 
reflection into the sociological perspective on theories that help us understand the anti-
immigrant behavior of right-wing populism. This includes theories on xenophobic, anti-
Islamic, and Islamophobic comportment within society, as well as social integration 
and disintegration theories to help explain how and why these feelings are expressed 
in political action and how these movements gain support from certain sections within 
society. 
The second chapter focuses primarily on the organization of the movements in 
question. An in-depth look into the particular Tea Party and Pro-Köln movements 
clarifies how these movements can be categorized as right-wing populist movements 
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and also locates certain characteristics within the two movements that make them 
appropriate for such a comparison. Concomitantly, it also addresses problems that 
might arise in such a comparison. This section chronicles the genesis of each 
movement, carefully illustrating the differing political environments from which they 
arose and how their ideologies are informed by this history. Additionally, the 
organizational structures are examined in fuller detail, showing how the internal 
organization of a movement is necessary in such an analysis.   
A case study on mosque construction follows this analysis.  An analysis into the actual 
planning and construction of the mosques (Park51 and the Zentralmoschee Köln) 
brings to light the particular context in which these populist movements generate a 
following.  By examining this process, certain developmental peculiarities are identified 
that help to explain the right-wing populist reaction. This chapter carefully examines 
the background of each mosque’s establishment, the debates surrounding the 
planning, both pro and con, an analysis in to the decision making process and an 
explanation of those specific results.   
In the fourth chapter, an overarching analysis into what each movement gained out of 
the mosque issue is considered. Here, the manner in which movements struggle for 
public awareness is reviewed, addressing more societal perspectives, including: how 
movements are perceived vis-á-vis media representation, the quality of each 
movement’s agency including the capability of leadership, their political 
maneuverability or how easy it is for these movements to organize within the political 
and societal structures, and lastly, how historical conditions play a role in the existence 
of right-wing populist movements.  These measurements help elucidate the differences 
in outcome from the two mosque cases and ultimately clarify what conditions promote 
a more robust movement.  
In the final chapter, an examination of the preceding work as a whole draws some 
conclusions on the nature of right-wing populism in today’s political and cultural 
climate and shall attempt to apply individual meaning in the respective countries.  It 
illuminates the peculiar case of why and how these populist movements stand out from 
the movements of the past, and expectantly shows how the presence of Islam is 
perceived as the latest “dangerous ‘others’” who are threatening the very essence of 
‘western culture’. 
N O A H  T E L S O N  
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1. Categorizing Populist Movements: A Theoretical 
Framework 
Populism, in all its forms, arises out of certain political and societal conditions that 
have been closely studied by social and political scientists for years.  The multitude of 
forms populism takes are endless and are routinely challenged and amended by newer 
conceptions and definitions.  From the classical studies of Latin American populism, to 
the nationalistic studies of a more violent Palestinian populism, to the contemporary 
studies of Western Europe’s working-class populism struggling with globalization and 
deindustrialization, populism remains an ever-allusive concept and exists on many 
political levels (McGuigan 2005: 180). Indeed, many researchers on the topic are 
reticent to make sweeping claims, realizing that in every country, populist 
manifestations are unique (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 7) and it would do better to 
understand, first, the ‘analytical core’ so that we can approach populism in such way 
that allows us to be critical of assumptions, rather than simply summarizing 
peculiarities in each conception (Panizza 2005: 2). However, all forms of discussed 
populism do share certain characteristics born from a distinct distrust in the 
established democratic rule. From this we can approximate a working definition that 
will serve as an umbrella term to encompass all other variations.  As Frank Decker 
stresses, for a term to be meaningfully applied, “it must be chronologically, spatially 
and materially restricted” (Decker 2008: 122). In doing so, Decker offers the term 
‘new right-wing populism’ as a way to more fully explain the rash of right-wing populist 
movements in Europe over the past half-century, notably those gaining their highest 
popularity in the 90s. This term, however, is rapidly becoming less sufficient in 
describing the brand of far-right populism that is evident today.  For Decker, this 
concept encapsulated a particular trend of right-wing populism that was largely 
characterized by failure; failure to overcome historical encumbrances, failure to 
produce charismatic leadership, and failure to enter into any meaningful arena of 
political action, among others. One cannot necessarily make the same judgment for 
the far-right movements we see today, simply because they are less marred by those 
failures.  In this chapter, therefore, while defining populism as a broad concept, I 
specifically discuss how right-wing populism, particularly of the past 5 years, is further 
defined as a variation of this broader concept.  In doing so, I put forth a new term to 
more adequately explain these movements according to a temporal, spatial, and 
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material specificity, ‘post-neo right-wing populism’. This term better positions 
movements like Pro-Köln, Vlaams Belang, FPÖ and company in relation to their earlier 
formations, and connotes a possible and worrisome sea change in right-wing 
popularity.  This concept will be discussed in the conclusion of this thesis. 
To begin, populism can be generally described as a political philosophy, most easily 
characterized by the claim that it has the voice of the people within a democratic 
system that is controlled by an elite force (Eatwell 2004: 11).  These claims become 
vocal or public when perceived threats to ‘genuine’ democracy are recognized 
(Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 4; Hans-George Betz 2001: 2; Hans-Georg Betz 2004: 7; 
Canovan 1999: 3; McGuigan 2005: 180; Panizza 2005: 1). These calls for a 
reevaluation of democracy under ‘threat’ are common place for any democracy that 
locates the root of power in the hands of the people but does not provide a sufficient 
arena for democratic debate (Mouffe 2002: 1; 2005: 51). How far these calls for 
restoration of power foment and become a destabilizing force within the political 
structures or are simply addressed within public discourse by those in power, however, 
is an important distinction. It speaks to the quality of a democratic institution that is 
able to account for the demands of populist parties whilst remaining stable.  Evidence 
of a failure to comfortably meet the demands of populist parties while remaining stable 
in the face of opposition is seen throughout Latin America, most notably with the 
archetypal populist Juan Perón in Argentina, where Peronism left a legacy of terror and 
fascistic tendencies. More commonly, though, populist rhetoric is addressed publicly 
and thoroughly in political and democratic discussion, effectively preventing any 
fomentation of revolutionary sentiment.   
Another important distinction of populism is that it exists beyond the descriptive 
restrictions of the political spectrum. While specific cases of populism do tend to follow 
an unmistakable political flavor, populism itself cannot be labeled as such; it is neither 
left-driven nor right-driven. The characteristics of populism are broad measures that 
specific political groups, movements, and leaders fall under, whether they are left or 
right of the spectrum. Populism is thus understood best as a “style” as opposed to a 
particular brand of ideology (Eatwell 2004: 12).  Indeed, many populists, though they 
clearly emerge from a certain political bent, claim they are neither left not right but 
rather speak for the ‘people’ (Canovan 1999: 5).  For this reason, it is necessary, as 
Decker argues, to restrict specific populist terms for them to be “meaningful” and 
N O A H  T E L S O N  
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indeed left-wing, centrist, and right-wing populism are all very different from one 
another.   
1.1 Right-Wing Populism 
The question that follows naturally, then, is what makes a populist movement 
specifically couched in the political spectrum? What characteristics distinguish one 
populist movement from another and who, within society, ultimately supports them? 
To tackle these questions it is first necessary to understand that while populism speaks 
to the tactics of a movement, political affiliations are reflections of the ideology 
espoused by that movement. For the most part, clear delineations can be made 
between left- and right-leaning populist movements even though they all seem to be 
born from the similar political climate, claiming to be the voice of the common citizen.  
For Decker, ideology makes a world of difference in explaining populist parties, and is 
susceptible to specific conditions within the framework of the movement. He argues 
that one such condition lies in the way a populist movement will define for its followers 
a meaning of an egalitarian society, “The characteristic features of the political 
substance of populism are a precarious synthesis of the cult of the individual and 
collectivism and an ‘ambivalent’ interpretation of equality” (Decker 2008: 123, italics 
mine). For contemporary right-wing movements, an interpretation of equality is always 
expressed in terms of nativist rhetoric that rails against the leftist claims of 
multiculturalism. Indeed, for Van Der Brug et al, right-wing populist parties are 
synonymous with anti-immigrant parties ( Van Der Brug et. al. 2005: 537).  
While the crux of the right-wing rendering of a fair and equal society is couched in 
anti-foreignization, it stems from traditional liberalism in that these movements, 
“[advance] the notion of “rights” - “rights of ethnic people, rights to a culture,” but 
also the right to individual safety, which address “deepseated [sic] and understandable 
fears about the erosion of identity and tradition by the globalizing (but only partially 
homogenizing) forces of modernity”” (Roger Griffin as cited in Hans-George Betz 2001: 
10).   
While, the general characteristic of right-wing populism revolves primarily around 
politics of exclusion, the manifestation of those politics also leads to further 
categorization of various right-wing populist movements. Roger Eatwell explains that in 
academia, many terms are used haphazardly to describe a plentitude of different 
groups on the right (Eatwell 2004: 5). In particular, the term ‘radical right’ and 
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‘extreme right’ are used interchangeably, when in fact there are fundamental 
differences that are often unacknowledged. Additionally, there are a multitude of 
criteria that exists in the literature, all which claim to define ‘extreme’ best (Mudde 
1996). For Eatwell, the most cogent argument for the difference between the two is 
made by German law, which locates the distinction in the relationship these 
movements or groups have with the established democracy. For radical groups, there 
is mere opposition toward certain aspects of the Constitution while extremist groups 
are outwardly hostile towards it (Eatwell 2004: 7; Hainsworth 2008: 9).   
In Eatwell’s clarification however, neither the radical nor the extreme definitions neatly 
apply to Pro-Köln or the Tea Party. In fact both groups use their Constitution as core 
tools to support their respective ideology. Many Tea Party activists claim they are strict 
‘constitutionalists’ claiming that America has strayed from the Constitution and they 
are simply fighting to restore it. Restoring constitutional values is also the trademark 
of many Tea Party campaigns (Rosen 2010), particularly that of Ron Paul, whose 
tireless presidential bids are bent on strict constitutionalism. For Pro-Köln, a similar 
claim is made that the movement is made up of, “democratic patriots, strictly 
defending [the German] constitution and the freedom of speech and meaning” 
(Bodissey 2009a).  Additionally, the concept of ‘extreme’ as opposed to ‘radical’ was 
often associated with anti-semitic sentiment and violent proclivities (Eatwell 2004: 8), 
which certainly does not help to explain why some might consider the Tea Party and 
Pro-Köln ‘extreme right-wing groups’. Both movements openly support Israel and show 
no real sign of classic antisemitism, as is evident in the Tea Party Caucus’ actions, 
including a resolution to endorse an Israeli offensive against Iran (House Resolution 
1553 2010) and Pro-Köln’s continuous parading of its Jewish membership and 
solidarity with Israel (Bodissey 2009a; Sheik Yer' Mami 2008: 21).  Nor are these 
groups supportive of violence, at least not publicly. Pro-Köln is quick to respond to 
what they claim are the violent acts of the left against Pro-Köln in particular  (Landen 
2008; Sheik Yer' Mami 2008: 21) and in America, there is an ongoing discourse on the 
use of ‘violent’ language, of which the left accuse the right, particularly the Tea Party, 
of abusing and vice versa1.   
                                                             
 
1 This is particularly evident with the Left’s attack on House Representative Allen West’s comments about arming the people for  revolution and Sarah Palin’s ‘cross hairs’ 
imagery which was associated with the shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords and the Right’s attack on Rev. Wright’s “goddamn America” sermon and Teamsters Union 
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However limited by language we may be, academics still concede room for ‘extreme’ 
labeling for those who are not outwardly violent or anti-semitic. Eatwell acknowledges 
the fact that, of late, attempts to define the ‘extreme right’ have dropped violence as a 
necessary characteristic. While it is still very much a feature of those groups on the 
fringe, there is room for vocally non-violent groups on the right in the ‘extreme’ family, 
because of their rigidly held beliefs expressed through exclusionary rhetoric 
transmitted through nationalism and racism2 (Eatwell 2000, 2004; Hainsworth 2008; 
Mudde 1996). While this is certainly not a guideline by which countries (particularly 
Germany) categorize right-wing movements, it allows for us to better understand 
where such groups lie in an increasingly clouded political spectrum.   
In addition to nationalism and racism, academics include ‘anti-democracy’ and a desire 
for a ‘strong state’ as features of the ‘extreme right’.  While Eatwell admits that anti-
democracy is a problematic term, “[...] given the obvious reasons in the contemporary 
West to hide anti-democratic sentiments” (Eatwell 2004: 8), I argue that desires for a 
strong state is equally difficult to substantiate. Certainly, these arguments involve 
numerous hours of decoding political rhetoric to avoid subjective results, particularly, 
as Eatwell suggests, when expressing anti-democratic ideals in the West is tantamount 
to political suicide. To be sure, to claim that the Tea Party holds anti-democratic 
feelings is to endeavor into a precarious playing field of intransigent terminology where 
threats of slander and libel are always lurking.  However, when Tea Party rhetoric often 
inspires inherently anti-democratic actions, such as armed resistance and the 
authoring of exclusionary legislation3 then is it fair to label the Tea Party, at least its 
fringe elements, as anti-democratic. In the same vein, claiming the Tea Party 
advocates a strong state is complicated, especially when their slogans so often rail 
against ‘big government’. The Tea Party rhetoric against big government, particularly 
by those ‘mainstream’ politicians (possibly hardline Republicans usurping the Tea Party 
label) however, is predominantly directed towards specific government programs 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
President James Hoffa’s ‘SOB’ remarks.  For further discussion see Neiwert, D. (2011). Allen West: 'No Place' for Harsh Rhetoric in Politics. David's Blog. 
www.crooksandliars.com. Retrieved September 7, 2011 
2 In this case, anti-Islamic sentiment. 
3 Tea Party members in Arizona have not only organized border patrolling militia, but also inspired the passing of SB1070 signed into law by Tea Party backed Governor Jan 
Brewer, which is argued to impede on citizens’ rights by making it a crime to be in Arizona without legal required documents.  See Arizona State Senate. (2010). Senate Bill 
1070 and Tea Party Patriots. (2010). United Border Coalition Tea Party. Tea Party Events  Retrieved September 12, 2011, from 
http://www.teapartypatriots.org/EventDetail/6673/mission.aspx. 
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tackling social issues, although this too is debatable. For instance, Tea Party 
movements gained immense popularity after relentlessly attacking the Health Care 
Reform Act signed by President Obama, demonizing the idea that the federal 
government can dictate to all US citizens not only what kind of healthcare they receive 
but that they must provide healthcare at all.  For the Tea Party, such an action is only 
morally reprehensible depending on where it falls in the purview of their rigidly held 
beliefs, which explains why many of them feel a federal ban on same sex marriage is 
not objectionable, but rather permissible because it reinforces Judeo-Christian values. 
Additionally, many Tea Partiers (though there is a distinction among the members on 
how) support the government’s role in protecting the rights of corporations.  While 
some were adamant critics of the bailouts in 2007-08, most support the Supreme 
Court decision on Citizen’s United that extended the reach of earlier cases, allowing 
American corporations to be recognized as citizens, resulting in federal protection of 
corporations to engage in dubious practices such as unlimited and anonymous electoral 
contributions to any campaign. Even more, Tea Partiers overwhelmingly reject taxing 
these corporations, many of whom at the moment pay nothing to the federal 
government. Given the selective nature by which the Tea Party define government 
overreach, the banner of small government must be taken with a grain of salt and, 
consequently, claiming that the Tea Party supports a strong state is also valid on 
certain issues.  
For all intents and purposes, I regard both of these movements as ‘extreme’, with the 
understanding that classic conceptions of the term no longer apply. While I do not 
regularly refer to them as such, I defend the use of the term, particularly in this body 
of work, as it helps to underscore the focus of the topic at hand: the reactions these 
movements have with the construction of mosques in ‘their neighborhoods’– reactions 
that are extreme in nature. The label ‘extreme’ points to the nationalistic tendencies 
common in populist movements and the racist or, in this case, anti-Islamic disposition 
both of these movements display. The following chapters on how these populist parties 
and movements are organized and how specifically they react to the construction of 
mosques shall reveal in closer detail how the Tea Party and Pro-Köln are deserving of 
the ‘extreme’ label. Though the definition is debated ad nauseam, in this limited scope, 
it serves its purpose well.  
 
N O A H  T E L S O N  





GET MA WP 05/2014 
1.2 Sociological perspectives 
Thus far, we have discussed what makes a populist movement unique and how right-
wing movements, particularly those of ‘extremist’ bent, are distinguished from the 
plethora of populist movements that exist. However, understanding that right-wing 
populist movements exist mainly as groups pushing for nativist rights within 
democracies, that support anti-immigration policy and are often described as 
nationalistic and racist does little to explain why they exist in society. What political 
and social anomalies exist that create nativist anti-Islamic sentiment and how are they 
propagated? To answer this question, one must look to the canon to understand how 
sociological perspectives on racism (xenophobia and anti-Islamic sentiment) inform our 
understanding of why these movements hold exclusionary points of view. We must 
explore the various sociological explanations, not just on how racist ideology is 
created, but also on how racism is propagated through collective reactions, by groups 
of people who struggle with contemporary crises of identity in a globalized world.  
To help explain these ideas of exclusionary feelings in a modern society on the most 
basest terms, I turn to the example of National Socialism and its policies. Often, in 
reflecting on the atrocities of the Holocaust, one is wont to ask how an entire nation 
was seemingly turned complacent in the active persecution and murder of so many, 
particularly in this day and age. No answer is complete and no answer is satisfactory, 
but we know that the Holocaust and modern approximations of the Holocaust are born 
out of similar trends: trends of economic uncertainties and political disrepair coupled 
with the anxieties of modernity. Of course this can only be explained within the context 
of the modern nation-state, and how the idea of nationalism, arbitrarily constructed, 
readily informs racist actions. As Pnina Werbner explains: 
“Although racism and xenophobia are not new phenomena – slavery, ethnic cleansing, 
pogroms, genocides, all preceded the formation of the modern nation-state – it is 
impossible to understand modern racism (or, indeed, political ethnicity, ethnic 
economic competition or identity politics) outside the context of the modem nation-
state, conceived of as a sovereign, territorially bounded and self-governing social 
collectivity. The most destructive and horrific forms of modem racism occur when an 
ethnic group – either the majority or a militarily powerful minority – captures the state 
and uses its apparatuses of violence, the police and the army, to attack civilians 
defined as the ‘other’.” (Werbner 2005: 6) 
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In this, Werbner argues that racism, or more specifically, modern day racism and its 
cohorts, are only understandable in the context of the modern nation-state where 
certain unique interactions take place that create extreme resentment. As Werbner 
states, racism and xenophobia have existed long before the nation-state, but these 
traditional conceptions of cultural and ethnic forms of racism are no longer supported 
by a modern day nation-state that is arbitrarily formed. Ethnic purity is a myth for 
much of the world, where nations are composed of a multitude of cultural origins. 
Racism in today’s world is thus partially a result of nation-states that, for whatever 
reason, cannot cope with the multitudes of ethnic claims. 
Of course not all corners of the modern world experience racism to the same extent.  
Indeed, numerous studies have sought to examine what social conditions create the 
highest levels of racism. From these studies, various theories have been developed 
which struggle to locate specific conditions. Many of these theories directly contradict 
each other, fueling academic battles of differing sociological approaches. Of the most 
notable are the realistic conflict theories that suggest ethnic groups living among each 
other tend to have negative attitudes of other races because they are directly 
competing for limited and scarce resources. Contradicting this claim, the contact 
theory suggests that the closer ethnic groups are the more positive their attitudes are 
of each other. This is supported by the idea that the more exposure one has with 
something or someone the more familiar and comfortable one is or becomes (Kalin 
1996: 171-2). For the most part, scholarship supports the ‘mere exposure’ claim to 
certain degrees. According to Oliver and Wong, contact theory must be more closely 
examined: 
“Like past research, we find strong evidence that people’s racial attitudes are 
influenced by their racial environments. Yet, unlike much of this research, we find that 
close proximity to out-groups corresponds with less racial antagonism. Among blacks, 
Latinos, and whites, as their neighborhoods become more racially diverse, negative 
stereotypes and competition with other racial groups drop. Negative perceptions of 
out-groups are higher for those who live in neighborhoods with more of their own 
racial group.” (Oliver/ Wong 2003: 580) 
Accordingly, to explain anti-Islamic sentiment among populist groups, particularly in 
America and Germany, may have to due with the ethnic separation these groups have 
from one another. In Germany, in particular, parallel gesellshaft is considered a major 
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hindrance towards the integration and assimilation of immigrants, particularly the 
Turks. These immigrant ‘out-groups’ largely live isolated from others, a condition that 
has existed for almost three generations. Though they exist in what might be 
considered close proximity, their neighborhoods remain virtually homogenous. 
These theories certainly provide insight on racial attitudes, but they help only to locate 
where these attitudes are more likely to appear. To understand how these feelings are 
generated in society, one must examine the conditions within certain contexts, 
particularly those areas where exclusionary points of view are widespread. Social 
disintegration theory (SDT) is one such theory that imparts invaluable wisdom on the 
topic.  
SDT puts forth answers that explain the tendency of societies to decline or disintegrate 
over time due to the lack of social welfare or proper social support networks.  
Heitmeyer and Anhut expand on SDT, to include explanations of violence and antisocial 
attitudes in society. In this work, however, I have further expanded on Heitmeyer and 
Anhut’s formulation of SDT. In my analysis, SDT naturally explains racism and 
negative racial attitudes, since they are constitutive antisocial behavior and quite often 
of violent behavior as well. In this way, we can use SDT to inform us of the conditions 
that exist in nations where there are higher levels of social segregation, limiting 
peoples’ awareness and openness to others, as contact theories suggest, that 
demonstrate how and why people resort to exclusionary feelings (based on racist 
attitudes, including xenophobia, antisemitism or anti-Islamism) and eventually 
violence.  Additionally, SDT examines society beyond economic terms, focusing on 
social recognition as a linchpin for just society (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 28). Social 
recognition is the term put forth, that explains positive conditions within society 
necessarily derived from social integration or the successful intermingling of people 
within a given space.    
According to Heitmeyer and Anhut, social integration is composed of three specific 
dimensions: 
1. social-structural integration (for example, having a job) 
2. institutional integration (for example, voter participation)  
3. socioemotional integration (for example, social support by family, friends)  
(Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 28). 
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When all of these dimensions are accounted for and provided, social recognition follows 
necessarily as a consequence. Simply put, social integration produces social 
recognition. Social recognition suggests that the well-being of society is taken care of 
and there is less potential for civil unrest. In situations of disintegration, people 
become increasingly alienated from society, and their reactions can manifest in 
violence or otherwise. Such situations occur, for example, in periods of high 
unemployment, where those without work feel pressure from an increasingly 
individualized system that demands economic security and provides increasingly less 
state welfare. In such cases, anger is turned to those who are less effected by market 
volatility, such as the wealthy elites (of which the Tea Party takes specific aim at in 
their rhetoric of the ‘fat-cats’ on the top, controlling government) or, in other cases, 
toward those (immigrants) who are perceived to have ‘taken’ jobs from those more 
‘deserving’ of them or are ‘leaching’ the system of welfare that ‘belongs’ to the 
‘natives’. In such a sense, when the problem of social-structural integration is unable 
to be solved, people, or groups of people, may react by forming consensus groups 
based on exclusionary policies. In other words, these groups become a way for those 
who have failed to secure economic stability and gain ‘success’ in an increasingly 
individualized world, and for those who feel isolated by government policies of 
immigration to vent their anger. As Heitmeyer and Anhut explain: 
“[...] despite the pressure to acquire status, the opportunities and risks of social 
positioning are spread unevenly. This leads increasingly frequently to disappointment 
for the losers in the modernization process; it unleashes feelings of resignation, 
impotence, and rage and causes a lack of positional recognition that undermines self-
confidence.” (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 29) 
Group formations, which arise from these conditions, like parts of the Tea Party and 
the entirety of Pro-Köln, are possibilities for people to curb the harm of an 
“undermined self-confidence”. Indeed, ‘scapegoating’ and other forms of discrimination 
and prejudices are often an alternative when coping with pressures inflicted by lack of 
recognition, particularly as a collective form of reaction (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 35).   
The banding together of people in collective reaction to perceived injustices is a 
phenomenon that is explained by a number of factors. In many cases, particularly in 
instances where social-structural integration is not solved, racism (in all its forms) is 
commonplace. However, it is a sense of solidarity (built of dysfunctional ways of 
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coping) that binds people with these feelings together. This bond held together by 
common xenophobic and racist feelings can be referred to as nationalism, at least an 
extreme form of nationalism (Wimmer 1997: 19). It is the initial belief that ones’ 
ethnic origin determines the social and political rights of a nation that is at the core of 
xenophobic feelings. It is therefore necessary to explore how ideas of ethnicity are 
formed and then used as tools to promote exclusionary policies.   
For Immanuel Wallerstein, the construction of ‘peoplehood’ is an arbitrary yet 
intentional phenomenon that aims to position one group of people against another. The 
classic arguments that defining oneself is an act of defining the ‘other’ are expanded 
upon as more specific tactics of ethnic solidarity. In labeling ‘races’, ‘ethnic groups’, 
and ‘nations’ we are essentially building categories that, “enable us to make claims 
based upon the past against the manipulable “rational” processes of the present” 
(Wallerstein 1987: 380). ‘Pastness’ is an important consideration for Wallerstein 
because it acts as the incontestable truth of a people, and is therefore used to make 
broad generalizations about others. The essentialist nature of ‘pastness’ describes for 
us how one self-proclaimed ethnic group is able to form prejudiced feelings against 
another. The ‘past’ in this sense is used to diminish a certain group, and then re-
instituted as a posteriori proof of one group’s diminished social standing. Of course 
‘pastness’ is in itself a construct that is often skewed and invented to build up the 
esteem of a specific group. Wallerstein explains: 
“Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they 
might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is 
a central element in the socialization of individuals, in the maintenance of group 
solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation.” (Wallerstein 
1987: 381) 
For these groups, the problems of immigration lie solely in the hands of immigrants 
who cannot or ‘refuse’ to integrate into the host society. These hindrances may be 
explained as ‘cultural differentness’ and connotes a functionalists claim that foreign 
culture (particularly Islamic culture) is incompatible with the native born (European) 
(Wimmer 1997: 22). Of course, functionalism as a respected sociological theory is 
discarded at once as parochial provocation. ‘Pastness’, however, though it details the 
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bigotries of ethnic groups, is an important facet to bear in mind. It reflects on the 
invented nature of nations and traditions4, while further drawing on the explicit 
dangers of such inventions, particularly when the intent is divisive. Then again, 
divisiveness is the staple of right-wing populist ideology. The very definition of 
xenophobia (and all forms of racism) necessarily indicates a desire (whether privately 
or publicly) to keep others separate. The bread and butter of right-wing populism is, 
similarly, a desire to sell separatist policy in the political arena. 
The theories that strive to explain these conditions are numerous and each one 
important in their own rite. In this reflection, however, a synthesis of many varying 
theories is endeavored. They first explain individual responses, derived from a lack of 
social recognition, and later, the manifestation of those responses in the protective 
formation of like-minded groups. Societies that are highly segregated by 
neighborhoods for example, may be hotspots for higher levels of negative racial 
behavior. These people, in segregated neighborhoods or observing other segregated 
neighborhoods in close proximity, cannot simply be expected to hold prejudiced 
feelings towards others a priori. Rather, they are further informed by outlying social 
cues, explained by SDT. This includes the breakdown of social support systems, 
particularly ones that are destroyed by contemporary formulations of capitalism, that 
supports individual competition and reinforces inequitable access to status and 
success. As a defense mechanism, these people react by forming groups of like minded 
individuals who produce sentiment that is supported by certain techniques, such as 
Wallerstein’s conception of ‘pastness’ which allows these people to feel vindicated by 
such views. These sociological perspectives also explain the rash of racism and anti-
immigrant sentiment that is sweeping briskly across the West today, suggesting that it 
is very much a product of contemporary society, built highly on the idea of competition 
and individualized egocentric attitudes, that continually whither concepts of community 
and solidarity, the so called, “losers of modernity” (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 30; 
Werbner 2005: 6). I apply these theories to the following body of work as guidelines 
for understanding their presence in contemporary society. This is a discussion with 
infinite inertia and is perhaps at its highest point of relevance. 
                                                             
 
4 as Hobsbawm describes cogently as, “deliberate and always innovative” (1983: 13) 
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2. Right-Wing Populist Organization 
The way in which any political institution is organized, whether it is a party or 
movement, provides indispensable details that one can use to make certain 
judgements. Particularly in a comparison, each movement must be analyzed from 
inception. Thus, the particularities of the environment in which these movements were 
conceived, and in which they now exist, are utilized as ways of evaluating, in this case, 
how one movement (the Tea Party) has become a noticeable force in American politics, 
while the other (Pro-Köln) is struggling to even gain mention in mainstream media.  
In the following chapter, details of the right-wing populist structures of both the Tea 
Party and Pro-Köln and how they organize themselves will be dissected.   
2.1 The Tea Party 
The organizational details of the Tea Party is, to say the least, immensely convoluted.  
When speaking of the “Tea Party” one is already entering questionable territory. First, 
the Tea Party is not a ‘party’ in the political sense. It is rather a movement that has 
been characterized by traditional conservative values, thereby aligning itself with the 
more libertarian branch of the Republican party. The Tea Party, does however, endorse 
candidates and currently has its own caucus in the House of Representatives. Though 
this caucus is made up entirely of registered Republicans (Bachmann 2010), various. 
Tea Party groups claim their membership spans all political orientations.  Immediately, 
attempting to categorize the Tea Party into a singular, definable entity is near 
Sisyphean in exercise. 
This task is only further confused by the decentralized structure of the movement. The 
Tea Party can be seen as a political movement that is stratified vertically and 
horizontally. Each stratification connotes either a difference in agenda (vertical) or a 
difference in leadership (horizontally). These divisions in policy and in command, 
however, do not establish any difference in name. The common parlance refers to any 
number of differing groups as singularly and ominously as “The Tea Party”.   
Horizontal division, as mentioned above, refers to the various Tea Party groups that 
exist in the United States that have different leaders and eventually different 
supporters. The unrest and discontent with government spending  that marked the end 
of Bush’s presidency and marred the beginning of Obama’s, unleashed a fury of 
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dissatisfied citizens that began to look to the budding idea of  the “Tea Party” as a 
place to vent their anger.  
In the first months of Tea Party activism, most of the organization was conducted by 
local Tea Party chapters that had little or no coordination with each other, other than 
through social media. Indeed, as early Tea Party activist and organizer, John M. 
O’Hara, writes in his book, A New American Tea Party: 
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Figure 1: Rasmussen, S., & Schoen, D. (2010) 
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“The idea was to have a “tea party.” There were already vague rumblings among the 
center-right grassroots and think tank communities about staging an event on the 
Fourth of July. [...] Already Facebook groups were multiplying, each carrying in its 
description iterations of the phrase [...] “Tea Party!” (O'Hara 2010: 5).  
The culmination of these emerging sentiments was a nation-wide protest that 
reportedly took place in 48 different places, “from St. Louis to San Antonio to Chicago” 
on February 27th, 2009 (Berger 2009). The effects of which saw a reemergence of 
right-wing political enthusiasm, non-stop media coverage, and the adjuration to 
publish  accounts of Tea Party glory (like O’Hara’s) that give the Tea Party movement a 
permanent place on the mantle of American history. The February 27th event no doubt 
thrust certain Tea Party ideals into the mainstream discussion, however, nearly three 
years later, the message of these original ‘tea parties’ has become quite muddled by 
‘astro-turfing’5 and by questionable social policies. This is not to say that its support is 
waining, in fact the Tea Party has established itself as a contender in the political field 
and has presented itself as a major challenger to the Republican Party (Karpowitz et al. 
2011: 308).  
Impossible to chronicle in this thesis, is the eventual shift from the grassroots 
organization of conservative activists taking issue with corporate bailouts, high taxes, 
and a general turn away from laissez-faire capitalism to the fundamentally established 
elite control of Tea Party organization and the inflammation of exclusionary principles 
that commonly blemishes the Tea Party appearance. Shortly after Tea Party protests 
began to gain traction in the media, many conservative political players positioned 
themselves favorably in the movement’s name. Overnight, what were once bungling 
politicians, were now newly revived Tea Party enthusiasts, speaking to the heart of 
America. For instance, John Boehner of Ohio, a Republican representative, quickly 
capitalized on the new wave of anti-Washington sentiment, though he has been there 
for years himself. He now sits as the speaker of the House. Additionally, former House 
majority leader, Dick Armey has asserted himself as a major player in the right-wing 
protest movement by running FreedomWorks (see Figure 1.), an organization that 
                                                             
 
5 A term used to describe so called ‘grassroots’ movements that not only receive support from mainstream or well funded sources but are created by them. See Ashbee, E. 
(2011). Bewitched – The Tea Party Movement: Ideas, Interests and Institutions. Political Quarterly, 82(2), 157-164, Rasmussen, S., & Schoen, D. (2010). Mad As Hell: How 
the Tea Party Movement Is Fundamentally Remaking Our Two-Party System New York: HarperCollins e-books. (274). 
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helps organize various Tea Party movements throughout the nation, funding their 
activism and essentially guiding their ideology (Rasmussen/ Schoen 2010: 146). 
According to watchdog groups Media Matters for America and Common Cause, 
FreedomWorks receives donations from such corporations as Verizon and AT&T, Exxon 
Mobil, the Koch Brothers, and has close connections with lobbying firms in Washington 
(Common Cause 2006: 7; Media Matters Action Network 2011). Such details provide 
an interesting layer to the idea of Tea Party ‘anti-establishment’ since it is precisely the 
establishment that corners much of their leadership and consequently their ideology. It 
is this differentiation between small town Tea Party groups who express legitimate 
concerns about government spending, and the ‘astroturfed’ movements that receive 
financial support from dubious sources and positive mainstream media coverage6 
delineating clear hierarchical relationships that illustrates horizontal stratification. 
Vertical stratification reflects more on the ideological differences that are at once 
perceivable in the Tea Party. This describes the more libertarian side, that concern 
themselves mostly with free-market principles and issues of the economy, while others 
in the movement find a message of homeland protection, the need to promote social 
policies that exclude foreigners from ‘a piece of the pie’. For the left, indiscriminate 
labeling of the Tea Party, as a whole, as ‘racist’ is a commonplace occurrence. Indeed, 
critics of the Tea Party locate most of their condemnation in the movement’s rather 
extreme social views, particularly regarding Islam. While much of this rhetoric may be 
unmerited, it is born from certain conditions that deserves a closer look7.   
Though the differing agendas among the multitude of Tea Party groups are varied, 
they do fall under an umbrella of core strict ‘constitutional’ values. These guiding 
principles are used as the Tea Party’s ideological mainstay. In fact, whether it is the 
commitment to limited government, distrust of political elite, or the concern that the 
‘undeserved’ are benefitting from the system, they all harken back to this limited 
understanding of the founding of America and of deep faith in the market (Ashbee 
2011: 158-9).   
                                                             
 
6 Media coverage of the Tea Party has been mostly the benchmark of FOX News.  However, other news agencies have also depicted the Tea Party quite favorably, such as 
CNN, made evident as recently as their joint hosting of Republican presidential debate with what they referred to as the “first ever Tea Party debate”. See CNN. (2011). CNN, 
Tea Party Express to Host First-Ever Tea Party Debate, Sept. 12. CNN Press Room. Cable News Network. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. Retrieved September 12, 2011, 
from http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/08/cnn-tea-party-express-to-host-first-ever-tea-party-debate-sept-12/ 
7 A more thorough analysis of this will come in the next chapter. 
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Particularly interesting in the scope of this thesis, is how the Tea Party frames social 
policies within the context of these underlying values. By and large, these values are 
positioned as market oriented ‘logic’, which reasons that regardless of specific 
situations, government protectionism is condemnable, made expressly evident in light 
of the recent bailouts (Ashbee 2011: 185; O'Hara 2010: 4; Rasmussen/ Schoen 2010: 
120). The fundamental objection is that the State assists those who are seen as 
unbefitting. On one hand, this idea is transmitted to those economic terms where 
financial bailouts were delivered to those who were ‘undeserving’ (banks), and, on the 
other hand, to social terms where state welfare resources are delivered to those who 
are ‘undeserving’ (foreigners). In this light, what are seemingly racist policies are 
masked by strict dogmatism of the market, coupled with a rather extreme nationalist 
understanding of society. The freedom of the market should be protected by the 
government while benefit of the market should be reaped by those who are 
‘deserving’. 
What, then, of the functionality of the Tea Party? We understand that it exists in a 
myriad of ways, both ideologically and structurally, but how does its arrangement keep 
itself relevant in the American political playing field? There are several explanations: 
most notably, the Tea Party was able to capitalize on certain institutional openings that 
were created in the wake of the bank bailouts and the creation of TARP8. The 
dissatisfaction of these policies led to massive voter turnout in senatorial and house 
elections that swept in Tea Party candidates, ousting “more mainstream contenders”, 
particularly long established Republicans (Ashbee, 2011; pp. 161). Additionally, as 
Ashbee clarifies: 
“[...] the advent of new technology, social networking sites and highly partisan forms 
of broadcasting have changed the opportunity cost ratios associated with campaigning 
and mobilisation processes, thereby opening up possibilities even for organisations 
with initially limited resources (Ashbee 2011: 160).” 
With their foot in the door, the Tea Party has been able to remain vocal on many 
issues, owing their success to support from popular media and actual democratic 
exercises that afforded them seats in the processes of government.   
                                                             
 
8 Troubled Asset Relief Program, signed into law by President George W. Bush which allowed the government to buy assets and equity from failing financial institutions. 
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Ashbee, however, argues that the Tea Party movement runs in ‘contestation’ with the 
established rule of the Republican Party and therefore may have little chance of 
survival. As made evident by established Republican caucus’ shooting down certain 
policy pledges put forth by the Tea Party, suggests that the Tea Party has little political 
weight to throw around, and is still very much under the command of the GOP (Ashbee 
2011: 161-2). This very situation, however, in combination with the latest Tea Party 
mobilization tactics, suggests that their is more unity with the Republicans than threat 
of the Tea Party’s dissipation. With the presidential campaign in particular, all 
Republican candidates are appealing to Tea Party ideals. Of course the idea of unity 
between the two is used limitedly. Since it is clear that much the Tea Party is being 
funded (‘astroturfed’) by recognized GOP facets, and that once prominent GOP 
members are now suddenly Tea Party heroes, it is fair to say that the popular image of 
the Tea Party has been effectively expropriated by the established Republican party as 
a ‘rebranding’ and effective way to reinvigorate their base.   
2.2 Pro-Köln 
In Germany, right-wing populism is more easily traceable, particularly in light of the 
Tea Party’s hard to define nature. Pro-Köln is one such case whose path from obscurity 
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to national attention follows more traditional populist indicators. While they cannot be 
considered wholly successful, it is clear that their tactics, and indeed their failures, are 
typical of populist movements throughout Europe.   
Pro-Köln first began in 1996 as a small cohort of people in Cologne sharing similar 
sentiment against the presence of Islam in Germany. However, the group did not fully 
gain traction until 2004, when they began to organize protests against a Muslim 
culture center and mosque that was being planned for construction. Through 
somewhat successful canvassing, the local movement grew to encompass a 
membership of around 200, and earned 4.7% of the Kommunalwahl (local election) 
with more than 16,000 people voting for their candidates (Kölner Statistische 
Nachrichten 2004). 5 years later, Pro-Köln gained further support in the electorate, 
climbing 0.7% in the 2009 Kommunalwahl to 5.4% (Kölner Statistische Nachrichten 
2009: 5, see Figure 2.). This improvement is seen by many as a success, and 
according to Michael Trube of the Mobile Beratung gegen Rechtsextremismus Berlin 
(MBR), even though their base was not that big, “they successfully installed 
themselves as a longer lasting party in the city” (2011). Pro-Köln’s agenda and 
program was quickly outsourced to neighboring regions where some people felt 
sympathetic to the group’s message. In 2005, the movement already began calling 
itself a Bürgerbewegung (peoples’ movement) and in a larger sense, as Pro-
Deutschland, using the model of Pro-Köln to spread ideology (Häusler/ Peters 2008: 
14). Two years later, Pro-Köln consolidated its power under the title of Pro-NRW as a 
way to convey a feeling of growth within the movement  encompassing North Rhein-
Westfalia (Häusler/ Peters 2008: 18). Shortly thereafter, the ‘Pro’ Bürgerbewegung 
appeared in Berlin, as well other cities throughout the country. 
Structurally, the various ‘Pro’ movements are uniform with one another. Where the Tea 
Party exists in a multitude of settings, incorporating a wide breadth of right-wing 
ideology, from the social to the fiscal, the ‘Pro’ movements are more or less concerned 
with one set of problems, allowing them to be more uniform in its presentation. The 
focus on anti-Islamisierung or the struggle against what they see as impending take-
over by Islamic persuasion is the cornerstone of their movement, and therefore certain 
images (i.e. mosques with red a line across them) are immediately associated with 
them. This is not necessarily the case with other images of right-wing ideology because 
they are not included in the ‘Pro’ movement dialogue, such as elimination of taxes and 
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strong belief in capitalism, as is the case with the Tea Party. In keeping with with this 
theme, all the various ‘Pro’ factions are very much in tune. In the recent elections in 
Berlin, for instance, Pro-Berlin had almost the same program Pro-NRW had for its own 
elections. Indeed, the reproduction of the Pro-Köln (and later as the Pro-NRW) model 
is as intentional as it is tactical. As Häusler and Peters explain: 
„Die Gründung von PRO [Deutschland] und PRO NRW stellt den Versuch dar, das 
Modell der extrem rechten Gruppierung PRO KÖLN auf andere Städte zu übertragen. 
[...] Dieses rechtspopulistische Vorgehen unter dem Deckmantel einer 
„Bürgerbewegung“ stellt eine neue Methode dar, um von Rechtsaußen an Einfluss zu 
gewinnen.  Das Schüren von Ängsten und Vorurteilen gegenüber ‚dem Islam’ steht 
dabei im Zentrum rechtspopulistischer Agitation.“ (Häusler/ Peters 2008: 2) 
The streamlining of the ‘Pro’ movement ‘look’ is further evident in their online 
strategies, where all the factions have nearly identical websites that include links to 
each other.   
While the visual and programmatic structure is very much in lock step with the vision 
and policy put forth by the original Pro-NRW group, there is little hierarchical 
relationship among them (Trube 2011). The different ‘Pro’ movements are thus 
independent from the others and are free to generate policy that is not directly 
delivered from a centralized location. In this respect, while Pro-Berlin carries the same 
banner as Pro-NRW, it is not obliged to. This relationship also helps to explain how 
leadership within the movement is managed. In Pro-Köln, for instance, there were 
alleged personal differences among the leaders, which resulted in Manfred Rouhs’ 
unexplained move to Berlin, as the head the of the Pro-Berlin party. For Rouhs, the 
move afforded him a palette upon which to lead without the encumbrance of authority. 
It is, however, clear that most policy for the movement is made by Pro-NRW.   
At first glance the organizational make up of the Tea Party and Pro-Köln are rather 
different. Where the Tea Party lacks in structural and organizational uniformity, it is 
more successful in conveying an emotionally salient voice. The ‘Pro’ movements are 
certainly more recognizable, in terms of what they stand for, but it is exactly what they 
stand for that does not resonate with a large portion of the German citizenry. By all 
accounts, the Tea Party is an elusive entity, that is as unclear in policy as it is in 
popularity. Paradoxically, Pro-Köln and its offshoots are as unpopular as they are 
organized. The following chapters, will further explain how these two movements, 
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because of their glaring differences in organization and structure, as well as the 
environments in which they exist, are responsible for the relative differences in their 
success as they call out for similar demands on society, particularly in reaction to the 
construction of mosques.  
3. Mosque Case Study 
This chapter will put forth an analysis of two particular mosques, Park51 in New York, 
and the Zentralmoschee Köln in Cologne, which will parse out the differences in the 
individual cases where the reaction from the Tea Party and Pro-Köln had similar 
quality. The first section will chronicle the reaction of the Tea Party to the proposed 
construction of the Park51 community center throughout the summer of 2010 leading 
up to the November elections of that year. The following section will detail the process 
by which Pro-Köln reacted to the proposed construction of the mosque in Cologne. In 
both cases, not only were the right-wing populist reactions similar, but so too was their 
failure to prevent to the construction of these Islamic centers9. As will be made 
evident, expressed aims of ridding their respective countries of Islam is coalesced by 
using the image of a mosque as a controversy, not necessarily by succeeding in 
preventing a mosque from being built.  Indeed, it is the existence of the mosque which 
provides necessary fodder for (certain parts of) these movements.   
3.1 Park51  
The Tea Party certainly receives its most scathing criticisms in its view of social policy.  
One particular area involves the Tea Party’s tenuous relationship with Islam. This 
characteristic was highlighted in the summer of 2010, when controversy broke out 
over the building of an Islamic community center near the hallowed grounds of the 
World Trade Center. The demands put forth by the Tea Party decried the construction 
as a wider symbol of decreasing American values. The presence of Islam, they 
suggest, will destroy the foundation of an America built on Christianity. Even worse, a 
mosque so close ground zero, they claim, is not only invasive but a symbol of Islamic 
‘victory’ in the West.   
                                                             
 
9 Park51 opened its doors September 21, 2011 and the Zentralmoschee Köln is still under construction, although was approved for planning August 28, 2008. See The Asso-
ciated Press. (2011). Islamic Center Opens Its Doors Near Ground Zero.   Retrieved October 2, 2011 from http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=140693172 
and Jenkner, C. (2008). Controversial Cologne Construction – Go-Ahead for Germany's Biggest Mosque. Muslims in Germany  Retrieved April 2, 2011, from 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,575170,00.html 
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The conservative outcry against the construction began as a small protest, but quickly 
became a national concern promulgated by 
Tea Party leaders. By the the height of that 
summer, protests against Park51 had 
transformed into an uproarious opposition of 
mosques in general. Indeed, across the 
nation, Tea Party rallies were routinely held 
in front of much smaller sites of Muslim 
prayer (Goodstein 2010), ultimately 
forgetting that the ignition of the 
controversy was over a community center, not a mosque. As Anushay Hossain writes, 
“This Community Center plans to house a culinary school, an auditorium, a swimming 
pool, a basketball court, and yes, space for prayer. But it is not a mosque, so we all 
need to stop calling it that” (2010). In the end, while the Tea Party’s rhetoric was 
ineffective in preventing the construction of Park51, it was able to maintain enough 
popularity to win sweeping elections that following November.   
Early protests against the demonized “9/11 mosque” were reported in May, 2010, 
when Tea Party “darling” Pamela Geller (Townsend, 2010), co-founder of Stop 
Islamization of America, began blogging 
about her concerns with the presence of 
an Islamic house of prayer close to the 
site of the fallen towers. Gellar is 
accredited as being instrumental in 
garnering attention to the issue: 
“[...] mainstream media picked up on 
angst about Park51, the planned cultural 
center and mosque in lower Manhattan, 
only after Geller began blogging about it. In recent weeks, Geller has become a chief 
spokeswoman against the project, appearing on ABC's "Good Morning America," CNN, 
NBC Nightly News, and Fox.” (Burke 2010) 
Before long, the Tea Party, with Gellar and its most notable leaders like Sarah Palin 
and Newt Gingrich in the lead (Goodstein 2010; Wheaton 2010) were able to foment 
anger toward the construction, as evidenced by the swelling crowds of protesters and 
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the numerous death threats that Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf and his wife Daisy Khan 
received (Robinson 2010; Schroeck 2010). In the span of three months, the image of 
Park51 had been transformed from its initial intentions of being a site, “that 
strengthens ties between Muslims and people of all faiths and backgrounds” 
(Blumenthal 2009) to a site tarnished by 
right-wing populist claims that the 
mosque is a sign of Islamic celebration of 
victory against America. In attempts to 
curb growing resentment planners for the 
community center went so far as to 
change the proposed name from 
“Cordoba House” to Park51, so as to 
deflate possible anger about what such a 
name might mean, but to little avail.   
What seemed like a minor triumph, 
reported by the New York Times, about 
the permission to begin construction on a 
building that was intended to bring a 
sense of healing and understanding to a neighborhood that had experienced a terrible 
event (Blumenthal 2009) became the Tea Party’s cause célèbre against an ‘imperialist’ 
Islam. However, almost every qualm the protest had with the proposed site was either 
invalidated by fact or renounced by the constitution itself10. From the onset, classic 
right-wing populist tactics of garnering support through fear-based rhetoric was at 
play. As Joseph Heathcott argues:  
“The recently ginned-up controversy over the Park 51 Muslim Community Center in 
Lower Manhattan (aka ‘‘Ground Zero Mosque’’) follows the same well-worn script. 
Right-wing strategists—and their close allies in the Republican Party and Fox News—
generate, and then report on, fear-driven ‘‘issues’’ grounded in very little fact and a 
great deal of hearsay, ad hominem, and speculation. These specific issues then spin 
                                                             
 
10 The First Amendment states that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” U. S. Constitution. 
Amendment I ("Congress shall make no law respecting…"). 
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into generalized anger over the supposed loss of pre-eminence of white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant culture.” (Heathcott 2011: 40) 
The claim that Park51 was being constructed as a “victory mosque” was repudiated 
countless times by Rauf, whose own record not only puts him in close ties with the FBI, 
where he gave speeches and conducted trainings after the 9/11 attacks (Tirella/ Diaz 
2010) but personally stated that the intention of Park51 was to, “push back against the 
extremists” (Blumenthal 2009). Additionally, Tea Party claims that funding for the 
project came from dubious sources and demands that an investigation be taken place 
were ultimately ruled as unfounded although the investors were eventually disclosed 
by Rauf (Fung 2010).   
Further implications of the Tea Party included rhetoric that the construction of the 
“mosque” in that place was somehow a slap in the face of those Americans who 
suffered through the events of 9/11. This sentiment was thrust into talking points 
across many media outlets after Sarah Palin posted messages to Twitter that, “called 
on “peaceful Muslims” to “refudiate [sic]” mosque plans [...] Ground Zero mosque is 
UNNECESSARY provocation; it stabs hearts. Pls reject it in interest of healing” 
(Wheaton 2010). The argument seemed to be that the planned construction site was 
simply too close to where the Twin Towers once stood, and that somehow the nearness 
of the building was insensitive. What was not taken into account by proponents of this 
idea, however, was the fact that not only is the site of Park51 not technically at 
Ground Zero, but that there are several other houses of prayer that are closer than 
Park51 to Ground Zero (see figure 3) and two mosques, though not closer than 
Park51, have existed in the area for many years without incident (Barnard 2010; 
Media Matters For America 2010b).   
What is elucidated by these facts is not merely deep seated hypocrisy on the part of 
these protests, but speaks to a broader narrative of racist and xenophobic sentiment 
that is alive and well in America. It is clear that the Tea Party’s demands are designed 
to exploit fears of cultural pluralism and tap into visceral emotional reactions from 
many average middle class Americans. Railing against Park51 with all its flimsy and 
unsupported claims is rather a tactic that aims to invoke a sense of anger within 
people, rather than at a system that has failed to provide. 
The age old story once again comes to mind of love thy neighbor hate thy enemy. It is 
replayed in every plot, in numerous ways. In this particular story the fellow American 
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is your neighbor, and the Muslim is your enemy, not because you have been treated 
badly by this Muslim but because you have been taught by Sarah Palin and the Tea 
Party that s/he is bad, and this feeling must be reciprocated (Sullivan 1996: 93). 
Americans sympathetic to the Tea Party’s social policies are enamored by the 
movement’s ability to lay out America’s problems by, “deflecting their attention away 
from the institutions that truly rule their lives and onto scapegoats” (Heathcott 2011: 
41). It is the extreme right, manifested as the Tea party movement and its current 
populist nature, part and parcel of prejudiced attitudes, that is leading the charge 
against Muslim rights and foreigners in general. The protest against Park51 is an 
expression of right-wing populism at its finest.      
3.2 Zentralmoschee Köln 
Pro-Köln was formed as a political party solely around the construction of the 
Zentralmoschee Köln in Cologne. The mosque, which will be the biggest in the country, 
no doubt represents a growing presence of Islam in Germany and broader Europe. For 
Pro-Köln, however, the presence of Islam, symbolized by the mosque, is a grave threat 
Figure 4: Omniquest 2007 
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to the foundation of European values (Bodissey 2009b). Indeed, much like the Tea 
Party, Pro-Köln’s aim is to stop the Islamisierung of Germany and has built its platform 
as a political party around the idea that Islam is trying to overthrow the tenets of 
Europe. In a promotional video for the “Anti-Islamization Conference”, Pro-Köln lays 
down its position on Islam quite clearly: 
“Today we find the symbols of Islamic power erected in all former Christian villages.  
But this isn’t enough to meet the demands for submission from this political-religion. 
The latest target: the cities of western Europe, among them Cologne” (Translated by 
Piggy Infidel in Bodissey 2009b; Pro-Köln 2009a).        
The rhetoric, much like the Tea Party, is again, very much in line with populist tactics. 
Accordingly, Pro-Köln’s message is expounded through fear-mongering, attempting to 
link the presence of Islam in Germany with the perceived social problems many 
working class Germans are experiencing.   
The Zentralmoschee Köln, like Park51, has been approved by the city council of 
Cologne, and is slated to open early 2012 (Abbany 2011). Similarly, the protests were 
wholly unsuccessful in stopping the project, which were arguably as unsubstantiated as 
the Tea Party claims. While Pro-Köln remains whole heartedly committed to the idea 
that Islam, in all its forms, is planning to somehow overthrow Europe from within, they 
lack any strong support for their cause other than visceral and emotional. To be sure, 
the party did gain in popularity as a result of their canvassing on the issue, but 
according to a poll conducted of 500 Cologne dwellers, a majority of them thought the 
mosque had a right to be built (Omniquest 2007; see figure 4). Certainly the size of 
the survey puts into question the soundness of the results, especially considering the 
relatively high numbers of “nein” answers11 especially considering the platform of Pro-
Köln in relation to the percentage of votes it received in the local elections.  
The mosque itself, separate from the claims of Pro-Köln, came under scores of 
criticism during its planning phase. While many believed the Muslims had a right to 
build a mosque, fewer believed the plans presented to the city council should be 
approved (Omniquest 2007). Hesitation to accept the plans were located in technical 
                                                             
 
11 Though the New York Times reported in a correction that, “The sample of 500 people was sufficient for a scientific poll; that sample was not “small,” nor did its size limit 
the poll’s “usefulness as a gauge of popular sentiment in a city of one million.”” See Landler, M. (2007). Germans Split Over a Mosque and the Role of Islam Europe  Retrieved 
April 13, 2011, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/05/world/europe/05cologne.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all 
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reasoning; the size was too big; the area was inappropriate; the planning did not 
include enough community involvement. In the nearby city of Duisburg, a similar 
(though not as big) mosque was built with relative ease and blessings from the 
community. As Emily Harris reports, there was, “no divisive debate there because 
German politicians, church and community leaders were invited to advise the project 
early on” (2007) whereas in Cologne, much of the planning was kept out of sight from 
public scrutiny though within the bounds of the law. However, for DITIB, the 
organization ultimately funding and organizing the construction, the criticism is 
erroneous since for them the construction of the mosque is simply a modernization of 
an already existing mosque. According to Sadi Arlsan the president of DITIB, “there is 
some prejudice [...] and lack of information” (Harris 2007). Overall, the arguments 
that DITIB should have included community involvement in the planning is moot point. 
In fact, according to German law, “Urban planning law takes into account the religious 
needs of the local population and the views of religious associations have to be heard 
in order to establish the [site] for constructing places of worship” (Robbers 2009). In 
cases of mosques, the call to prayer is also agreed upon by the community, in terms of 
what volume is appropriate. Indeed, the German constitution protects the right to use 
the call to prayer and loudspeakers as a part of the free practice of religion 
(Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Robbers 2009). Perhaps it was the 
degree or level at which the community was involved that angered some, but the point 
remains that DITIB was at no legal fault.   
As stated previously, in both cases, Park51 and Zentralmoschee Köln were approved 
and built or are under construction with little to no question in the eyes of the legal 
system. They were planned and funded under appropriate measures and did nothing to 
arouse suspicion. Yet, in both cases, a great debate was stirred, attracting questioning 
by-standers and a news frenzy. While there was nothing evident to claim mischief on 
the part of the Muslim community attempting to establish a house of prayer for 
themselves, the tendency for the protesters, particularly in these two cases, seem to 
concern mainly with turgid smoke screens. Non-issues of ‘nearness to Ground Zero’ 
and ‘amount of community participation in planning’ dominate the discussion and 
further help to substantiate the movements that are battling against Islamic presence. 
In the following chapter, a close examination the Tea Party and Pro-Köln’s right-wing 
populist characteristics will show how these ‘non-issue’ tactics are not only deliberate 
but is indeed an integral method of garnering support. The chapter will mainly focus on 
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the successes of the Tea Party and failures of Pro-Köln through various criteria. While 
it shall present a clear understanding of how the American environment is more 
receptive to this type of movement than Germany, it will also further clarify the 
various standards by which to gauge the function of contemporary right-wing 
populism. 
4. Successes and Failures 
How right-wing populist parties and movements, like the Tea Party and Pro-Köln, gain 
support in elections shall be the emphasis in this chapter. By analyzing how each 
movement fared in a variety of fields, we can approximate a level of success necessary 
for a movement to gain popular footing in the national political sphere.  By examining 
media sources, blogs and personal accounts, this chapter will look at five qualitative 
indicators (see figure 5), informed by Frank Decker (2008), that help explain the 
favorable or unfavorable outcome for right-wing populist movements, and allow us to 
understand how the successes of the Tea Party are different from the only moderate 
successes of Pro-Köln/NRW.  These criteria are: media representation, leadership, 
agency capability, political maneuverability, and historical conditions. 
4.1 Media representation 
Figure 5 
Media representation is enormously important for any right-wing populist movement. 
The ability to present one’s platform in front of a camera or in the pages of a 
Tea Party Qualitative indicators Pro-Köln 
Somewhat positive Media representation Somewhat negative 
Charismatic Leadership Non-charismatic 
High Agency capability Limited 
High Political maneuverability Limited 
Little burden Historical conditions Encumbered 
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newspaper is invaluable to the spreading and proliferation of a message. Securing a 
spot within the media, however, is not necessarily an easy task. Often, mass media 
outlets tend to ignore social movements, either for ideological reasons or for the mere 
lack of attraction to the cause. This partially explains the often crass positions of 
protesters we see on the nightly news. For social movements then, the objective 
becomes one of creating a voice that not only resonates with its base, but is loud 
enough to attract the reporters. “The task of translating the chronic problem as 
described by the critical community into an acute problem that will attract media 
attention is the province of social and political movements” (Rochon, as quoted in 
Porta/ Diani 2006b). Accordingly, the fixation on seemingly ridiculous objections (i.e. 
the distance of Park51 from Ground Zero or the lack of community input in the 
construction of Zentralmoschee Köln) can be understood as a tactic to attract attention 
to the cause rather than genuine qualms with that particular sentiment. The actual 
sentiment, rather, is located in a greater space of discourse, for example, against the 
general presence of foreigners in the nation, or more specifically, of Muslims in 
America and Germany.   
Additional forms of media are also becoming an important staple for social movements, 
particularly of movements that are too radical for established media outlets to cover. 
This is certainly the case for Pro-Köln who is largely ignored by the media for having 
far too extreme policies. The ‘Pro’ movement thus relies on a network of websites and 
social media in order to circulate their message. The ability for a movement to 
diversify its media coverage is key, particularly when that group’s message is of a 
certain extremist tone. As Porta and Diani argue, “Pluralism of the mass media and the 
richness of meso-level media emerge as important conditions for the spread of 
movement messages” (2006a). Consequently, the movement, in its creation of online 
networks, has established its own news publications and video libraries (see "www.pro 
Koeln.tv" in Pro-Köln 2009c) by which to disseminate their otherwise unheard 
viewpoints. 
Another way for right-wing populist movements, in particular Pro-Köln, to receive 
airtime is by being elected to parliamentary seats, even at the lowest levels. In this 
way, media outlets can no longer ignore them, since they are a part of the functioning 
political process. In Germany, public broadcasters are legally required to give all 
members of Parliament time on the air (Decker 2008: 124). In this way, populist 
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movements can use low level electoral victories to boost their presence on mass media 
coverage.   
For the Tea Party, airtime on major news networks is of little challenge. Networks like 
Fox News and major publications like the New York Post have tended to place the 
movement in favorable light. In a review of 19 articles from July and August 2010, 
only five portrayed the Tea Party in unfavorably (see appendix 1). Fox News is 
unquestionably biased toward the Tea Party and is certainly the source of news for Tea 
Party supporters themselves as evidenced in a CBS/New York Times poll that shows 
Tea Party supporters overwhelmingly watch the channel over other choices (Ashbee 
2011: 157; Heathcott 2011: 40; see appendix 2). 
Already, there is a major difference between the way media treats these two 
movements. We can deduce from the readings and observation that the Tea Party is, 
in relation to Pro-Köln, far more positively portrayed in the media. Though we are 
comparing across two separate systems, where media coverage may be conducted on 
completely different levels, the point remains; Pro-Köln’s mainstream representation in 
media is almost non-existent, subsisting rather, in blogs and online platforms. The Tea 
Party, on the other hand, is largely coddled by mass media like Fox News, New York 
Post and others as mentioned previously, and as a result, is able to broadcast its 
objectives to a wider and more sympathetic audience.           
4.2 Leadership 
For right-wing populism, as in any movement, leadership is key.  In fact, for Frank 
Decker, “The most conspicuous formal [characteristic] of right-wing populist parties 
are that they [...] rely on charismatic leadership” (Decker 2008: 123, italics mine). 
Populist parties envision democracy that is ‘people-centric’ and charismatic leadership 
corresponds with this idea of simple and direct political institutions (Jan 2006: 245). It 
is therefore integral and necessary for populist parties to have capable leaders, who 
can speak clearly and colloquially to the people. Often this reflected in speech and 
attire that shows how they are part of ‘the people’ but retain unique qualities that set 
them aside as the savior of the nation and its citizens (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 5; 
Canovan 1999: 6).  
The Tea Party has many revered figures, that are all shopped around news cycles as 
the influential leader. Michele Bachmann, Rand Paul, and Marco Rubio are among the 
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newly elected Congress members who ran as Tea Party champions (see appendix 4 & 
5). Of course, there are Paul Ryan, John Boehner, presidential hopeful and intellectual 
father of the Tea Party Ron Paul, and, outside the elected position is Glenn Beck, 
acting as a quasi evangelical voice as a Fox News and talk radio host, and the “Mama 
Grizzly” Sarah Palin, among others, who are all seen as charismatic leaders. While 
there is no singular person leading the charge for the movement, as is common for 
populist parties, the Tea Party has been able to supplement the lack of centralized 
guidance under a leader by employing other tactics, like highly capable agency, which 
will be discussed shortly. Regardless, however, these figures either have the youth and 
vigor or the gravitas and appearance to energize their base.    
For Pro-Köln, leadership has been an enduring problem. This is not to say that they 
lack leadership. In fact, many of their leaders are intelligent and capable people but 
lack in certain appearance and unity. Markus Beisicht, for example, is the current 
president of the party, and while he is very eloquent and thoughtful, his political 
framework is derived from some very worrisome places (Trube 2011). As a student of 
law, he was highly involved in circles of particularly questionable backgrounds, 
including the “Ring Freiheitlicher Studenten” which was founded by members of the 
far-right Cologne fraternity “Germania.” The “Ring Freiheitlicher Studenten” is an 
exclusive organization who keeps company with very far-right notables, like Klaus 
Klunze, a lawyer who defends neo-nazis today. Additionally, Beisicht is a former 
member of the “Republikaner”, another far-right party, and in 1991 founded his own 
party the “Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat” which gained moderate attention until 
the formation of Pro-Köln (Häusler/ Peters 2008: 22) where he has been since.   
The past ties of these leaders is immensely important in assessing how successful they 
will be in garnering support for their cause. In Germany, in particular, historical 
rationale plays a large part in the decision process of German voters, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. Indeed, for much of the leadership in Pro-Köln, past 
connections with far-right or even neo-nazi groups is a major hindrance to their 
success as leaders. This certainly also includes Manfred Rouhs, along with other ‘Pro’ 
party leaders Judith Wolter, Markus Wiener, and Heinz Kurt Täubner (see Köln ganz 
rechts).  
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4.3 Agency capability 
The ability of leadership in right-wing populist movements to put forth meaningful and 
coherent goals lies in the faculty of agency. The intervention of right-wing ideology into 
the mainstream discourse is obviously an important goal, and can only done if the 
leadership possesses the right tools to do so. This does not simply imply that 
leadership must be charismatic, but rather, that they are well connected to influential 
institutes and other parties (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 10). 
The Tea Party’s success is largely a result of its ties with organizations outside the Tea 
Party itself. As alluded to in previous chapters, the Tea Party is well connected with 
lobbyists, PACs, corporations and news outlets. In fact, the Tea Party agency is so well 
supported, that charismatic leadership can be considered a front to the wheelings and 
dealings of back-room meetings. To clarify, populist parties of all types pride 
themselves in putting forth candidates that carry an air of the ‘homely average Joe’, 
the outsider to the establishment. Traditionally, these are just façades for people who 
actually have substantial history in elitist positions, who do indeed have experience in 
politics. However, the Tea Party has started a trend of endorsing candidates that 
actually have little experience in the formal political system (Ashbee 2011: 158). As 
Michael Gerson explains: 
“In Tea Party theory, inexperience is itself seen as a kind of qualification. [...] People 
like [Tea Party candidate] O’Donnell are actually preferable to people like [Karl Rove], 
because they haven’t been tainted by public trust or actual achievement.” (Gerson 
quoted in Ashbee 2011: 158). 
As a result, the Tea Party may actually elect these types of candidates, who then enter 
the system with little knowledge of how matters run. This, however, is of little 
consequence since the endorsement of these candidates means heavy support from 
organizations that shape policy for them anyways. Again, as detailed previously, 
groups like FreedomWorks, run by Washington insiders, actively endorse and create 
platforms for the Tea Party and its candidates, allowing them to focus more on image 
than experience. Additionally, certain connections made through agency give easier 
access to media outlets. In this regard, the capability of Tea Party agency is high, in 
that its relationship with influential organizations allows them not only political and 
financial support, but also important airtime.   
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In Cologne, once again the story is quite different. The rather extreme views of the 
movement cast them aside as outliers in the political arena, alienating them from 
important relationships within the system. The agency of Pro-Köln exists mainly in its 
ties with other right-wing parties in the country and abroad. The narrow scope of their 
agenda also contributes to their political isolation and limited capability of agency. 
Since Pro-Köln focuses primarily on the Islamization of Germany, it loses possible 
opportunities to forge relationship with other right-wing organizations that focus their 
energy in other areas. In the case of the Tea Party, most of their connections to 
supporting organizations come from an alignment in fiscal and economic thinking, a 
stance Pro-Köln does not articulate or convey coherently.   
In a sense, its limited agency has afforded Pro-Köln with relationships only further to 
its right. However, these relationships have resulted in some very interesting 
organizational peculiarities for right-wing populist groups that generally hold onto very 
rigid concepts of nationalism. For example, on May 7, 2011, the party organized the 
“Marsch für die Freiheit” which was attended by representatives from numerous right-
wing populist groups throughout the West, including the Tea Party (Diener/ Öztürker 
2011). This event symbolizes a curious shift in the classic ideology of right-wing 
populists in Germany, who traditionally held highly nationalistic views that were 
resistant to outside groups. Furthermore, Pro-Köln is openly supportive of Israel and 
its attempts to shut down Islamic presence in the country, a characteristic very 
unfamiliar in German right-wing populism (Bodissey 2009a; Trube 2011). In the end, 
however, these connections have done little to increase support.    
4.4 Political maneuverability  
The ease at which political movements, of one particular ilk or another, can form and 
organize within a political system is another gauge we must measure in order to fully 
understand right-wing populism. Hindrances to the organization by institutional 
conditions reflects the effort by which these parties and movements have to give in 
order to carry out their goals. As Decker explains, “[political institutions] influence the 
competitive balance between parties and, hence, the scope for newcomers to make a 
breakthrough at the polls and/or gain a foothold in Parliament” (Decker 2008: 124).   
In Germany, the political party system of proportional representation, which is 
characteristically pluralistic, is relatively open to the formation of new parties, in the 
sense that many simply exist. However, most of these parties are not integrated into 
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the system because they fail to obtain a minimum of five percent of the vote in 
Parliament. Decker expounds: 
“Parliamentary representation is important, because it gives outsiders the media 
coverage that is indispensable in order to achieve sustained electoral success, not least 
because public broadcasters are legally required to provide representatives of all 
parliamentary parties with airtime to speak in pre- election broadcasts. In terms of 
electoral campaigning and public funding too, challengers in Germany are not unduly 
handicapped.” (Decker 2008: 124) 
For obvious reasons, then, new political parties strive to reach the five percent 
threshold, in order to sustain themselves as a legitimate voice in the so-called 
representative democracy. However, this is mostly only achieved on the local level, 
because certain structural hindrances within the federal government tend to dissuade 
parties from pursuing higher office. This in part, due to the fact that most populist 
parties receive protest votes in regional elections. The electorate, however, is less 
likely to protest vote in federal elections because there is less incentive to do so after 
protest votes have already been cast in regional elections (Decker 2008: 124).   
Pro-Köln, even though it is already established as political party and did receive over 
five percent of the vote, remains only a minor player in North Rhein-Westphalia. In 
Berlin, the ‘Pro’ movement did not come close to reaching the five percent mark, and 
in national German elections, the prospects are even lower.   
For the United States, party structuring is far more difficult than in Germany in terms 
of creating a new political party. However, because the Tea Party is not a political 
party but rather a movement giving wind to certain factions of the Republican Party, it 
is able to assume the political maneuverability possessed by those cohorts within the 
GOP. This suggests that the Tea Party, in comparison to Pro-Köln, has a much easier 
time navigating institutional structures that otherwise would impede movement. This 
claim is supported by the fact that all Tea Party candidates that were elected in the 
November 2010 elections, either for the House of Representatives or the Senate, is a 
registered Republican, implying that Tea Party ideology is simply a brand of 
Republicanism, that is supported by a popular social movement. To be sure, without 
the support of parts of the Republican base, the Tea Party would have a much more 
difficult time accomplishing goals.    
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4.5 Historical conditions 
In the unique case of right-wing populism, historical conditions can play a large role in 
understanding the success of the movement or party. Germany certainly has a long 
and deplorable past with right-wing populism in the form of National Socialism (Decker 
2008: 125; Karapin 1998: 225). Memories of the Holocaust and the Second World War 
are always present in the minds of many Germans, and is certainly reflected in the 
polls. In almost every vein of organization, successful parties are careful to distance 
themselves from the likes of neo-nazis and the general tone of that history. Apart from 
the social implications of the historical burden, Germany also has in place legal 
conditions which prohibits ‘militant democracy’ (Decker 2008: 125).   
Furthermore, German extremist parties continually suffer from the infiltration of former 
neo-nazis or neo-nazi sympathizers, who perpetuate the stigmatization of these 
groups. Right-wing parties in Germany must, therefore, be very careful about 
attracting membership from the far-right (Kitschelt/ McGann, as quoted in Decker 
2008). Pro-Köln has made an attempt to appear like it is free from this burden12 
(Trube 2011), however, opposition to the ‘Pro’ movement has remained steadfast in 
revealing the party’s various links to the NPD and other far-right organizations (see 
Köln ganz rechts).   
The historical burden is so great on the German right-wing, that extremist parties have 
the lowest popularity among any other right-wing group in Europe (Decker 2008: 125).  
Indeed, many experts agree that because this fact is so pervasive, it explains why all 
right-wing populist parties in postwar Germany have been wholly unsuccessful. 
The historical encumbrance that exists in Germany is absent in the American political 
system. While regrettable actions on the part of the American government in the past 
and present do exist, nothing compares to the atrocities of the National Socialist 
experiment of the 30s and 40s. Consequently, there is more room for the rise of right-
wing populist groups in the American context. Arguably, the stigma of Naziism exists in 
the US as well, but the brand of Naziism against a certain person or group simply 
means less than in Germany.   
                                                             
 
12 This might help to explain why Manfred Rouhs left the leadership of Pro-Köln. 
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To be sure, Naziism is not a popular sentiment in the US, but its presence does exist in 
the form of white supremacist groups throughout the country. Concomitantly, there 
are groups that form around exclusionary viewpoints, not unlike National Socialism, 
but are, in every respect, not Nazis. The Tea Party, for example is certainly not 
informed by nazi ideals, and in the few cases where ties were made, little has come of 
it. Perhaps it is the cultural distance Americans have from the National Socialist era 
that makes them less worried about prejudiced platforms, or simply the lack of any 
historical atrocity that works to shape the conscience of voters, the fact remains that 
Americans are less affected by historical encumbrances than Germans.   
4.6 Explanations 
This chapter seeks to examine various indicators that help us to understand how Pro-
Köln fares in comparison to the Tea Party as a right-wing populist group. In every 
gauge of analysis, the Tea Party has had a distinct advantage, with the slight exception 
of media representation. Media representation, though still very limited, has been one 
of mark moderate success for Pro-Köln, not only because the party gained enough 
votes to legally provide them with airtime, but because of their utilization of 
independent sources of media. To be sure though, the quality of leadership and the 
capabilities of that agency, political structuring and the ease at which creating new 
political formations happens within governmental structures and within society, and 
the role of historical conditions have all served either to the disadvantage of Pro-Köln 
or to the advantage of the Tea Party.   
For Pro-Köln, the most pervasive factor inhibiting it in all criteria is the historical 
encumbrance of the Holocaust. Because of its loose affiliations with certain 
organizations, the acquiring of substantial exposure in the media, the strengthening of 
its agency by opening up relationships with mainstream support systems, and the 
social and legal implications those ties, together with this historical burden, have on a 
political system designed to curb the fomentation of extreme right ideology, Pro-Köln 
simply cannot compete with the success of the Tea Party, though their views, in terms 
of Islamization, are very similar.  
In attempting to gain airtime on news media outlets, the ‘Pro’ movement has had to 
resort to independent forms of media, like social networking and blogging, which 
simply do not compare to the daily support from news giants like Fox News that the 
Tea Party receives. However, due to relative electoral success in 2009, Pro-Köln 
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reached the five percent threshold, suggesting to many, that the party was becoming a 
more substantial party in the region. The mild success, in this regard, suggests the 
party is making inroads in the established political landscape, by growing its limited 
media resources. Outside North Rhein-Westphalia, however, the movement is not yet 
seen with such growing popularity.    
Of course, leadership in the party has a direct connection to this historical aspect since 
many of them keep or have kept company with people and organizations that actively 
promote the ideals that have created this enduring burden for them. Similarly, the 
ability of leadership to access important tools for disseminating their ideology is at 
once cut down by their well-known biographies; a condition Tea Party leaders do not 
have to worry about. This historical burden also largely influences the political 
maneuverability, in that the system (stated in the Constitution) is structured to keep 
alive the memory of National Socialism as something never to be repeated again. This 
is translated into precaution about all extreme right-wing groups.  Again, the Tea Party 
is free from this, since it plays the part of a guiding voice for parts of the GOP, one of 
the two strongest political parties in the country. Accordingly, it enjoys the support of 
well connected organizations, allowing it the ability to function relatively 
unencumbered by lack of exposure.   
In summation, the major explanation for the success of the Tea Party can be 
accredited to its propped up support, through ‘astroturfing’, while Pro-Köln can be seen 
as a failure because of certain overwhelmingly pervasive historical conditions. 
5. Conclusion 
The Tea Party’s message seems to resonate louder with Americans than that of Pro-
Köln’s message with the Germans, even when considering that this particular brand of 
right-wing movement, that establishes anti-Islamization as a major part of its 
platform, has increased in numbers throughout the entirety of the western world. The 
Tea Party, on all accounts, is more successful than Pro-Köln in conveying a stance that 
is exclusionary toward Muslims because it simply does not have the historical burden 
of the Holocaust, or anything similar, to stigmatize its social policies regarding the 
presence of Islam in America. It also conveys its messages better than the ‘Pro’ 
movement because it is stacked with the power and might of the Republican Party and 
organizations that have remarkable sway in the political process. Though not all 
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Republicans are Tea Party sympathizers, it is evident that major conservative 
organizations have funded the movement, trained its leaders, and provided an outlet 
for media representation in the form of Fox News. Pro-Köln simply does not have that 
support, and it is owed to the fact that they themselves are merely ‘right-wing 
extremists’ in Germany, a label that has historically inhibited them in the country. This 
difference is laid out previously as a distinction between the grassroots organization of 
Pro-Köln and the ‘astroturfed’ Tea Party.  
Earlier in this work, I put forward the idea of ‘post-neo right-wing movements’ as a 
way to describe a new trend of exclusionary populism in Germany and wider Europe.  
This term attempts to differentiate the ‘new right-wing populism’ of the past, 
characterized by complete failure and odorous antisemitism, from groups like Pro-
Köln/NRW who have attempted to change their tune by becoming openly sympathetic 
to the Jewish struggle, and have not been marred by complete failure, due to their 
moderate success in regional elections. The term, in light of this body of work, is 
specific to the rash of right-wing populism, driven by a particular brand of nationalism 
that locates its purpose in the eradication of Islam. It is this detail that distinguishes 
these groups from its predecessors, and deserves a specific lens. If nothing else, it is a 
call to view these movements with more caution, since they are distinctly different.     
Indeed, simply writing the threat of Pro-Köln off as a ‘failure’ in comparison to the Tea 
Party, and as a ‘historically proven fact’ that all extreme right-wing movements in 
Germany are bound to lose, is a disservice. Anybody who follows the Tea Party, knows 
that it contains within it, a certain inertia that is rare among movements, but that is 
not to say other forms of right-wing populism should be ignored, particularly 
nowadays. Indeed, Pro-Köln, while not nearly as popular as the Tea Party, represents a 
movement that is slowly gaining momentum. Though it is gaining traction only in 
certain areas and only in small increments, it is learning from the failures of the past.  
It understands the historical encumbrance it faces, and it is attempting to rebrand 
itself. Pro-Köln and its parent, Pro-NRW, has attempted to spread a new image of itself 
that says, “look at us, we’re different from those Fascists.” We see this in its attempts 
to allay ideas of Naziism within its ranks and within its policies. The movement proudly 
supports Israel, advertises its Jewish support, and allegedly makes a distinct effort to 
purge its membership (including its leadership) of ties with neo-nazis; a policy that no 
other right-wing populist party has attempted in the past.    
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Certainly, the comparison of Pro-Köln to the Tea Party masks its small yet remarkable 
success in Germany’s fourth-largest city. It is certainly not my intention to hide this 
creeping anti-Islamic sentiment. To the contrary, it is my wish that this exercise in 
comparison, not only affords readers the opportunity to reevaluate possible feelings of 
benevolence toward the Tea Party, to provide certain insight in how the German 
population might be assessing the Tea Party, but also to illuminate the regrowth of 
prejudice in Europe in the form of anti-Islamic sentiment and keep the dialogue of an 
open and ethical society alive and well, so as to combat the bigotry that informs such 
movements.   
Indeed, it is the duty of a moral and ethic society to maintain the struggle for Utopian 
life. A small project, building this path, is ensuring that exclusionary viewpoints have 
no room to grow. We can only do this by remaining diligent in exposing them within 
society, by examining their presence and critically questioning their presence. To be 
sure, a simple relabeling of these groups alone is not enough, but it is a start. We must 
reevaluate the conditions that created a necessity to relabel these groups in the first 
place. Contemporary post-scarcity societies that produce prejudiced feelings are sick 
and only until we push to accept a moral, productive economy, with emphasis on 
community, can we expect it to get better. We must demand a society couched in a 
“naturalistic outlook, [with an] emphasis on discipline with freedom and responsibility 
with imagination” (Bookchin, 2001; pp. 4) over current conditions marred by the 
abscess of obsessive materialism and wealth, individualized success, and unattainable 
status, creating impotence and rage, the foundation of exclusionary feelings that is so 
prevalent today; only then are extreme right-wing populists parties and movements, 
characterized by these feelings, bound to lose. 
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Apprendix  
Appendix 1: New York Post Articles (July/ August 2010)  
*Articles that contain significant comments about the Tea Party  
Source: NYPost.com 
Articles* Favorable towards Tea Party Unfavorable toward Tea Party 
Who can capture the Tea Party vote? 
√  
Tea Party boots big  √ 
NAACP shows its ugly side 
√  
The racist rules of O's Justice Dept. 
√  
Dems migrating into elex danger 
√  
Lazio's two 'dead'lines 
√  
Angle says campaign to defeat Reid God's 'calling' 
√  
Andy, rivals in mosque split 
√  




McCain beats Tea Party fave  √ 
Beck and call 
√  
Penny prankster's dirty-tricks campaign  √ 
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Articles* Favorable towards Tea Party Unfavorable toward Tea Party 
The Dems' deficit-hawk fakery 
√  
Cuomo's camp likes kook Carl  √ 
Beck: US has 'wandered in darkness' 
√  
Nancy's nefarious conspiracy theory 
√  
Gov. hopeful Paladino: House poor in prison dorms  √ 
 
 
Appendix 2: CBS New/New York Times Poll (April 5-12 2010)  
The Tea Party Movement: Who are They  
q95 Which one of the following television networks do you watch most for information 
about politics and current events -- ABC, CBS,NBC, CNN, FOXNews Channel, MSNBC, 
or don't you watch television news? 
Total Respondents 
 
 Total % Tea Party Supporter % 
ABC, CBS, NBC 26 11 
CNN 17 7 
Fox New Channel 23 63 
MSNBC 3 1 
Don’t watch news 16 6 
Other 3 1 
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 Total % Tea Party Supporter % 
Combination (vol.) 11 10 
DK/NA 1 1 
 
 
Appendix 3: List of Conservative House Wins (November 2010)  
*All Representatives in this table are Republican  
**Has been endorsed by a Tea Party organization  
Source: Tea Party Express (2010), FreedomWorks (2010) 
Representative* Incumbent Tea Party** 
Adams No √ 
Bachmann Yes √ 
Barletta No √ 
Bass No √ 
Benishek No √ 
Berg No √ 
Black No  
Brooks No  
Bucshon No  
Buerkle No √ 
Canseco No  
Chabot No √ 
Cravaack No √ 
Crawford No √ 
Dent Yes √ 
DesJarlais No √ 
Dold No √ 
Duffy No √ 
Ellmers No √ 
Farenthold No √ 
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Representative* Incumbent Tea Party** 
Fincher No  
Fitzpatrick No √ 
Flores No √ 
Gardner No √ 
Gerlach Yes √ 
Gibbs No √ 
Gibson No √ 
Gosar No √ 
Griffin No √ 
Griffith No √ 
Grimm No √ 
Guinta No √ 
Hanna No  
Harris No  
Hartzler No  
Hayworth No  
Heck No √ 
Herrera No √ 
Hultgren No √ 
Hurt No  
Johnson No √ 
Kelly No √ 
Kinzinger No √ 
Labrador No √ 
Landry No √ 
Lungren Yes √ 
Marino No √ 
McKinley No √ 
Meehan No √ 
Mulvaney No √ 
Noem No √ 
Nunnelee No  
Palazzo No  
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Representative* Incumbent Tea Party** 
Pearce No √ 
Quayle No √ 
Reed No  
Reichert Yes  
Renacci No √ 
Ribble No √ 
Rigell No  
Rivera No  
Roby No  
Ross No  
Runyan No √ 
Schilling No √ 
Schweikert No √ 
Scott No  
Southerland No √ 
Stivers No √ 
Terry Yes √ 
Tipton No √ 
Toberi Yes √ 
Walberg No √ 
Walsh No √ 
Webster No  
West No √ 
Yoder No √ 
Young No √ 
 
 
Appendix 4: List of Conservative Senate Wins (November 2010)  
*All Senators in this table are Republican  
**Has been endorsed by a Tea Party organization  
Source: Tea Party Express (2010), FreedomWorks (2010) 
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Senator* Incumbent Tea Party** 
Chuck Grassley Yes  
Dan Coats No  
David Vitter Yes  
Jerry Moran No √ 
Jim DeMint Yes √ 
John Boozman No √ 
John Hoeven No √ 
John McCain Yes  
John Thune Yes √ 
Johnny Isakson Yes  
Kelly Ayotte No  
Lisa Murkowski Yes  
Marco Rubio No √ 
Mark Kirk No  
Mike Crapo Yes √ 
Mike Lee No √ 
Pat Toomey No √ 
Rand Paul No √ 
Richard Burr Yes  
Richard Shelby Yes  
Rob Portman No  
Ron Johnson No √ 
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Senator* Incumbent Tea Party** 
Roy Blunt No  
Tom Coburn Yes √ 
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